• We review how the ideological polarization of members of the House of Representatives (elite polarization) is affected by:
• the drawing of more ideologically extreme districts.
• We show there are fewer competitive congressional districts -having a near balance of Democrats and Republicans -following redistricting.
• We show that more competitive districts can be drawn without sacrificing other values, such as compactness or minority representation.
• We discuss the prospects for redistricting reform.
Increasing ideological polarization of American political elites ("elite polarization") has coincided with a marked increase of policy gridlock within the national government. Concerns with the government's ability to address major policy issues, even those with broad public support, have led many to search for causes for and solutions to a government so paralyzed that it cannot satisfy the basic democratic value of executing the will of its people.
Among the frequently cited causes for elite polarization is redistricting, the process of periodically drawing district boundaries to ostensibly align them with communities of interest, representational criteria, and neutral administrative goals, such as equalizing populations following a new decennial census. States are responsible for drawing House of Representatives district boundary lines; in most states, politicians are in charge of the process, creating an obvious conflict of interest because redistricting affects their chances of reelection. constitutional referendum approved by voters. Among the technical innovations that quietly emerged during the last round of redistricting is public access to webdeployed redistricting software and data, which enabled greater public participation in the drawing of alternative redistricting plans (Altman and McDonald 2014b) . The public approaches redistricting in a fundamentally different manner than politicians, particularly with respect to political goals such as partisan fairness and district competition (Altman and McDonald 2013 , 2014a , 2014c . These public plans thereby provide a benchmark comparison to plans fabricated by politicians to concretely assess how districts may be made more competitive through reform efforts and to what degree this may ameliorate polarization.
The Causal Relationship between Redistricting and Polarization Figure 1 Causal Connections Affecting Elite Polarization
Much has been written about the causes and consequences of political polarization, including by the contributing authors to this volume. Our purpose is not to rehash the extensive polarization literature. However, we do wish to provide context for redistricting's role. In Figure 1 we sketch how redistricting fits within theoretical frameworks explaining elite polarization of the House of Representatives. The linkage between redistricting and elite polarization is mediated through district partisanship, as visualized in Figure 1 . The causal chain from redistricting to elite polarization has two necessary conditions. First, the ideological character of districts' constituencies must be related to the ideological character of their elected representatives. Second, redistricting must be able to affect districts' ideologies. We begin our discussion of the first order causal connections with causes that directly affect elite polarization, and then with second order causal connections affecting these first order causal connections.
First Order Connection: District Partisanship → Elite Polarization
With respect to the first condition, there are no reliable national survey measures for the ideology of districts' constituencies since sample sizes within districts are typically too small to develop reliable measures. Scholars frequently measure districts' ideologies using districts' partisanship, constructed from election results for statewide offices (McDonald 2014) . Presidential election results are analyzed for national studies since this is the sole office elected nationally, thus providing a comparable metric across all congressional districts. We follow the scholarly norm equating district ideology with district partisanship.
The median voter theorem provides a theoretical basis to expect that district partisanship is a factor in representatives' ideologies. Downs (1957) formally shows how in plurality-win two-candidate elections, candidates who wish to win office will, in equilibrium, position their ideology such that it is the same as the district's median voter's ideology, in an electorate where all voters are distributed along a one-dimensional left-right ideological continuum. (This is, of course, a caricature of Downs's nuanced theory; we discuss complications and other motives subsequently.)
The logic is simple and, in the abstract, plausible. Consider a candidate whose primary motivation is to get elected. A candidate wins office by receiving 50 percent plus one of the votes. If voters prefer the candidate with the closest ideology, then without knowing what the other candidate will do, the first candidate is always best off positioning his or her ideology at the median voter. There are two cases to consider. Case one: if the second candidate positions at any point other than the median, the first candidate on the median is supported by all voters to the left or right (those with an ideology in the opposite direction from the median as the second candidate's position), as well as half of the voters between the median and the ideology of the second candidate. The first candidate wins and the second loses.
Case two: if the second candidate also positions at the median voter, then voters are indifferent between the two candidates and they randomly choose between the two candidates. A first candidate who chooses a position other than the median is gambling that the other candidate will position his-or herself even further from the median. Why take this risk when there is a clear pathway to victory by positioning at the median?
The redistricting application is straightforward. The ideology of the median voter of a district is related to the proportion of voters on the left and right (i.e., Democrats and Republicans) who are assigned to a district. If more voters on the left or right are added to a district, the ideology of the median voter of the district will be a voter further to the left or right, respectively. Those in charge of redistricting thus have the ability to affect not only which party is favored to win a district, but, by manipulating the proportion of voters in a district on the left or right, the ideological character of the winning candidate as well.
To empirically demonstrate the relationship between district partisanship and elite polarization, which we will refer to again when we describe other causal pathways, we plot a measure of district partisanship against a measure of members' ideology in Figure 2 There are three important features of Figure 2: (1) the correlation between district partisanship and members' ideologies, (2) party divergence of members from different parties representing districts with similar partisanship, and (3) candidate divergence among members of the same party representing districts with similar partisanship. We first discuss the first feature and return to the two others.
Figure 2 District Partisanship and Representatives' Ideology
Central to the argument that redistricting can affect polarization, and consistent with the median voter theorem (Downs 1957) , there is a strong linear relationship between districts' partisanship and members' ideological voting patterns, with members from more Republican districts voting in a more conservative manner. Figure 1 is not controversial. This pattern of candidate convergence to the district ideology is presented in textbooks (Abramson et al. 2014 ) and confirmed by an analysis of all candidates' ideologies -incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates -derived from members' ideological voting scores (Ryan and Lyons 2014) and candidate surveys (Erikson and Wright 1980; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Stonecash et al. 2003; ) . This convergence is evident in other legislative activities, such as bill sponsorship and roll call voting within specific issue domains that may be sensitive to constituency demographics (Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin 2010) . Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001) find candidates more closely hew to district partisanship in the most competitive districts near 50 percent (this heteroskedastic dynamic is most apparent among Republican incumbents in Figure 1 ), although they also find that challengers to incumbents less closely converge to district partisanship than incumbents. A caricature of Downs (1957) portrays the median voter theorem as predicting candidates' full convergence to the median, framing divergence as a This is more evident in the Senate, where senators who are of the same party and who represent the same state have different ideologies (Poole and Rosenthal 2000) .
It is also evident in how members from the same party replacing a retiring incumbent do not adopt the same ideology (Poole and Romer 1993; Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani 2003; Theriault 2006) . Indeed, these replacements have tended to adopt a more extreme position than their predecessor, thereby contributing to polarization with moderates being replaced by extremists (Bafumi and Herron 2010) . Incumbents may also adapt to changing political environments by modifying their ideological voting over the course of their careers (Theriault 2006) , with members moving toward their district partisanship (Stratmann 2000) .
It is for this latter reason that we draw a causal arrow from candidate divergence to elite polarization, although Figure 2 snapshot suggests there is much ideological variation among members representing districts with similar partisan composition, which is not necessarily contributing to ideological divergence of parties.
Second Order Connection: Redistricting → District Partisanship
The second condition necessary for redistricting to affect elite polarization is that redistricting affects district partisanship. It may seem self-evident from observing the intense politics that surround redistricting, and the related problem of gerrymandering, that a causal connection between these two exists. Indeed, many scholars find redistricting affects partisan division of power among legislative seats (e.g., Tufte 1973; Cain 1985; Gelman and King 1994; Hirsch 2003) , while others have proposed evaluation metrics on how much partisan gerrymandering may be constitutionally permissible (Grofman and King 2007) . However, this second order effect is challenged by competing explanations for changing district partisanship, particularly the number of competitive districts that, through the connection of district partisanship and members' ideologies, drive elite polarization.
Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning (2006) We update McDonald's (2006a) analysis of the total number of competitive districts before and after redistricting for the most recent round of redistricting in Figure 3 . The table reports the number of districts within two competitive ranges, 1 "Normalized two-party vote" is the vote share for a major party candidate expressed as a share of the two major parties' candidates, excluding minor party candidates. This vote share is then normalized, or simulating a hypothetical 50/50 election, by subtracting the difference between the overall national two-party vote share and 50 percent from the two-party vote within a specific district.
2 For similar findings in the decline in competition following a redistricting, see Swain, Borrelli, and Reed (1998) and McCarty et al. (2009: 673) .
45-55 percent and 48-52 percent (the latter are included in the former). The vote between the two major party candidates (commonly referred to by scholars as the "two-party vote") is drawn from various issues of the Almanac of American Politics.
The presidential vote shares are normalized by subtracting the difference between the leading candidate's vote share and 50 percent to simulate a hypothetical 50/50 election. To control for potential confounding campaign effects, statistics are calculated for the same presidential election, the one most recently occurred prior to a given redistricting. strengthens these findings. 3 The preponderance of the evidence shows redistricting results in fewer competitive districts in the past three decades.
3 An issue for the post-redistricting statistics is that some precincts are split by new districts, and the votes within these districts must be apportioned to the new districts (McDonald 2014) . Using the 2012 presidential vote shares for the 2012 statistics, the number of districts is 84 within a 45-55 percent range and 29 within a 48-52 percent range. This alternative measurement provides stronger evidence for redistricting to result in a decrease in the number of competitive districts. Whereas the statistics reported in Figure 3 show a modest decrease of four in the number of competitive districts in the wider range between 2010 and 2012, the alternative measure shows a 30-district decrease. Similarly, whereas the statistics reported in Figure 3 show the narrower range has a twelve-district decrease in competitive districts, the alternative measure has a thirteen-district decrease. Second Order Connection: Regional Realignment →
Second Order

District Partisanship
In Figure 1 we draw an arrow from regional realignment to party divergence, but the party divergence theory implicitly involves district partisanship. As Jacobson Full Causal Path: Redistricting → District Partisanship →
Elite Polarization
As the preceding discussion should make plain, redistricting cannot be responsible for all elite polarization. Scholars find redistricting makes a contribution. Stonecash, Brewer, and Mariani (2003) examine changing district composition and conclude these changes produce more homogeneous districts that contribute to polarization.
However, these scholars do not decompose the factors driving changing district demographics. Stronger direct evidence that redistricting affects polarization comes from studies that examine districts changed by redistricting. Carson et al. (2007: 878) find that "redistricting is one among many factors that produce party polarization." Their method examines the ideology of members elected from congressional districts that changed substantially following a redistricting. They find that these districts tend to be more extreme than others in their partisanship, and that members elected from these districts also tend to be more ideologically extreme. Using a similar approach to examine congressional districts that were changed by redistricting, Hayes, Hibbing, and Sulkin (2010) also find members' behavior is responsive to districts' change in terms of how they co-sponsor bills when their district becomes more competitive and how they vote in specific issue domains that may be of importance to certain constituents, such as rural constituents and farm policies. Members may modify their behavior in anticipation of constituency change wrought by redistricting (Boatright 2004) , although it may take several election cycles for members to fully adjust to their new constituencies (Stratmann 2000 ).
Yet, there are limits to redistricting effects. Carson et al. (2007: 889) making districts more competitive would lead to a more heterogeneous party caucus and a weakening of leaders' powers.
While these studies find redistricting affects elite polarization to varying degrees, some authors suggest that creating more competitive districts could, to the contrary, increase polarization. In the presence of competition, candidates must rely more heavily on party support, and thus may be more responsive to party leaders who demand party divergence. Cox and Katz (2002) note that incumbency advantage increased following the reapportionment revolution in the 1960s, when districts initially became less competitive. Engstrom (2013) notes that elite polarization has historically been higher when districts were more competitive.
However, McDonald (1999) notes that the causal arrow may be reversed, that when voters polarize, an optimal gerrymandering strategy to take advantage of a less volatile electorate is to draw districts that only appear more competitive.
Can Redistricting Be Reformed to Reduce Polarization?
The preceding discussion primarily involves observational studies of the factors that In Figure 4 we plot all legal redistricting plans that were publicly available in competitive districts -is more compact than the adopted plan. 12 In Florida, the adopted plan has one competitive congressional district out of 27, while a plan exists with eight competitive districts. In Ohio, the adopted plan has zero competitive districts out of 16, while the plan exists with eight competitive districts.
In Virginia, the adopted plan has two competitive districts out of eleven while a plan exists with three competitive districts. In all, the adopted plans have a total of three competitive districts out of 55, while plans with the maximum number of competitive districts have a combined 21 competitive districts. We do not know if it is possible to draw more competitive districts since those drawing plans may not have been trying to maximize district competitiveness; indeed, in Ohio and Virginia, many non-legislative map drawers participated in competitions where competitive districts were one criterion among others. 12 This is true for other criteria such as respect for political boundaries and partisan fairness; for space considerations, we do not present scatter plots of these other criteria (Altman and McDonald 2013; 2014a; 2014b) . Our analysis of alternative legal redistricting plans that include minority voting rights districts reveals that, compared to the adopted plans that have one competitive district out of 55, at least 21 competitive districts can be drawn in Florida, Ohio, and Virginia. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009: 678) , employing simulations with contiguity and compactness constraints, find that 80 competitive districts are possible nationwide (although the authors do not define their measurement of a competitive district). We cannot fully reconcile these two analyses since McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal examine the entire country and our scope covers only three of the most closely contested battleground states.
Furthermore, we do not believe that one should simply extrapolate our findings to all states; for example, there are clearly small uncompetitive states with one or two districts where redistricting can have little or no effect. Still, we believe that the opportunities for competitive districts, and a reduction in elite polarization, may be greater than the McCarty et al. analysis indicates.
Where we agree with McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) is that not all congressional districts, and likely not even a majority, can be made competitive, and that redistricting is but one piece of a greater polarization puzzle. Further, even where districts could be made competitive, whether redistricting reform efforts leads to competitive districts depends on the manner in which the reform is implemented. Contrast the implementation of redistricting reform in California with the implementation of reform in Arizona.
As Kousser, Phillips, and Shor (2014) discuss, California's reform effort is likely to create competitive districts and to affect polarization only by happenstance.
California has no explicit requirement for competitive districts, and the commission adopted only three congressional districts with a 2008 Obama two-party vote share between 48 percent and 52 percent. In contrast, in Arizona, the commission is explicitly tasked by the state constitution to draw competitive districts. Arizona's commission produced three congressional districts out of nine, which is a seemingly difficult task when also drawing two heavily Democratic Latino districts in this Our analysis differs from some others such as McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) in finding that redistricting reform can have a substantive effect on polarization. Redistricting is among the few inputs to elite polarization that are both measurable and readily subject to policy intervention. We believe redistricting institutions can be developed to proactively increase the number of competitive districts and thus reduce elite polarization.
It is possible that redistricting reform to increase competitive districts may have second-order effects beyond the direct effects of electing more moderate members. These secondary effects could act in the opposite direction; we note that increased district competition is historically correlated with greater ideological polarization (Engstrom 2013) . However, we judge (following Engstrom) that historical correlation is a result of strong and polarized parties using biased districts with thin margins in attempt to maximize partisan advantage -and not a result of competitive districts causing polarization (McDonald 1999) . Moreover, there are theoretical reasons to believe that the secondary effects will further decrease polarization. For example, if the conditional party model of government is correct (Rohde 1991) , injecting the House of Representatives with more moderates will empower them to constrain the power of party leaders to enforce party discipline, which is among the primary drivers of elite polarization through party divergence.
Based on the current evidence, we conjecture that the secondary effects will be neutral or positive -but note that these effects have yet to be systematically measured in the literature.
We recognize that there are many other reasons to embrace redistricting reform and competitive districts. With specific regards to competitive districts, they provide general election voters with the opportunity to hold members accountable as their districts are not so electorally safe, and it likewise allows voters to hold parties accountable as their majorities may be at risk. Members who represent competitive districts may not draw strong challengers if they represent their districts well (by being ideologically moderate); however, it is possible that a greater number of competitive districts can lead to a greater number of competitive elections, and higher associated campaign costs. Likewise, competitive elections may result in a greater number of voters being unhappy about the winner (Brunell 2008) . We are reminded that any electoral reform is inherently a balance of competing values (Arrow 1951) . Properly designed redistricting institutions may ameliorate elite polarization, although the effect may not be as large as advocates hope. As with all reforms, there may be unanticipated consequences. Still, if one is concerned about elite polarization, redistricting should be a reform option on the table.
